inasmuch economically determined as it was socially determined -conditioned by political interactions with existing social structures.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the model specification and identification strategy; Section 3 describes the data; and Section 4 presents the results, followed by a concluding section which discusses some policy implications.
Estimation Strategy
There are three main econometric issues of assessing the effect of privatization on mortality: (i) measurement error, (ii) coding bias and (iii) endogenous selection bias.
First, the Enterprise Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has
constructed two widely used scales of progress in small-and large-scale privatization from a planned (coded as 1) to a market (coded as 4.3) economy (Table 1) . A major limitation to these indices -aside from the evident non-linearity in their effects -is that they measure privatization outcomes rather than implementation. Countries that failed to fully implement privatization may have done so because the social costs were too greatan effect obscured by only scoring countries which successfully effected privatization more highly.
3 Thus, to assess the full social costs of privatization, measurement of the implementation of privatization, irrespective of privatization outcome, is critical. Second, since EBRD economists who constructed the privatization measures were also key policy advisors, there might be ideological pressure to code successful countries as more 3 In several transition countries ambitious privatization agendas were announced by policymakers following early democratic regime changes in the early 1990s. Progress was stymied, or even reversed, after the initial waves of privatization reforms due to popular resistance (See L. King and A. Sznajder 2006) .
"privatized", especially since country performance in a given year has already been observed at the moment of coding (E. Falcetti, M. Raiser, and P. Sanfey, 2002, B. Merlevede and K. Schoors, 2004) . Third, higher privatization scores strongly relate to other positive transition outcomes such as greater democratization and non-corrupt government regulation. Building these observed and unobserved factors into the privatization measure will bias the direction of the findings in line with their effects on social costs.
To overcome these limitations we have designed a novel measure of mass privatization based upon country descriptions in the EBRD Transition Report series and codings used for the EBRD privatization indices. The halfway point on the EBRD largescale privatization scale, or a coding of 3, involves privatization of more than 25 percent of large-scale enterprise assets (Table 1) . We code an indicator for whether a country implemented a program that transferred the ownership of at least 25% of large-state owned enterprises to the private sector through vouchers and give-aways to firm insiders.
4
More challenging is the need to cope with endogeneity in the policy decision to adopt rapid privatization as a capitalist reform strategy. Our analysis follows a quasinatural experiment approach, which has been strongly advocated by both statisticians and economists for evaluating the effects of policy interventions (J. Angrist and A. Krueger, 2002, D. Freedman 1999) . The key advantage is that country implementation of rapid privatization can be treated as independent, such that outcome differentials across these strata can be directly attributed to the policy. Mass privatization seems to be a promising candidate for this framework, particularly since the reform itself was intended to operate as an 'economic shock,' rapidly inducing the formation of a capitalist class (C. Gerry and C. Li, 2002) .
The independence assumption that underlies evaluation of the treatment effect of the policy, however, will not be unbiased if policy changes are driven by politicians' and stakeholders' motives in ways that relate to health outcomes (i.e., E[D it , Z it ] ≠ 0 and E[Z it ,
H it ] ≠ 0). Although recent comparative studies by economists have assumed privatization and its different methods of implementation to be exogenous policy choices (J. Bennett, et al 2004 . M. Boycko, et al 1995 , we proceed by carefully assessing potential sources of endogeneity using instrumental and selection models.
Endogenous Selection Bias
There are several well-established statistical methods that can be employed to account for endogenous selection bias (e.g., matching, instrumentation, and statistical adjustments). It seems straightforward to adapt a "Heckman-type" selection model (J Heckman, 1979) 
Mortality Data
A potential limitation to the analysis of health data during transition is the validity and reliability of health surveillance. More specifically, there are concerns about shifts in mortality stemming from the development of new monitoring and detection methods, as well as inaccurate or mis-classification of death resulting from the transformation of health systems. Such unobserved relationships or measurement errors may obscure the relationship between health outcomes and privatization programs. Overall, the consensus from scholars is that, despite these limitations, the data during reform periods are sufficiently valid and reliable to permit empirical analyses for comparative purposes (E.
Brainder and D. Cutler). More generally, mortality data is regarded as more reliable for comparative analysis than macroeconomic data (R. Filer and J. Hanousek, 2001 ).
Nonetheless the analysis copes with potential distortions in four ways. First, the variation between countries is removed by controlling for country-specific effects. This method effectively holds constant any country's differential propensity to underreport mortality. As long as the bias over time does not change, comparisons over time will be consistent. Second, a set of dummy variables for each year is used to absorb any classification bias arising from changing international death classification codes, which would cause sudden breaks in the data.
7 Third, a control for military conflict is used to compensate for underreporting in specific countries during turbulent periods highlighted as problematic by WHO. Fourth, life expectancy data from the WB World Development
Indicators are used to predict variations in life expectancy data from the WHO 2007 data as a statistical technique to purge measurement errors, which produces attenuation bias, from variation in the data. As a robustness check, the predicted life expectancy data are used as dependent variables.
Health Production Function
Our main specification follows the standard health-production model, which is based on the concept of an individual-specific health production function originated by Grossman (1972) and later advanced upon by Anand and Chen (1996) :
where Q it is a vector of economic and policy variables; D is a vector of demographic characteristics; HC it is non-health human capital; N it is a vector of dietary and nutritional inputs; Z it is a vector of medical resources; V it is a vector of environmental conditions;
and S it is a vector of individual country characteristics.
Combining available comparative data, we specify a basic model:
This was particularly notable for infant mortality, for which a structural break occurred in 1992/1993 when the more restrictive Soviet-era definition was substituted for the WHO definition (Shkolnikov 1997).
Here LE is male life expectancy and PRIV is one of the three privatization variables described previously. We operationalize Q in eq. 1 using five variables: the natural log of GDP per capita (GDP), which is a robust determinant of health (L. Pritchett, Summers, LH., 1996); the EBRD price liberalization index (LIB), because price setting by markets was theorized to be the main complementary policy needed for privatization to succeed (Selowsky 1997); the Freedom House democratization index (DEM), which was theorized to exert independent health benefits and facilitate transition (O. Adeyi, G.
Chellaraj, E. Goldstein, et al 1997); and the occurrence of military or ethnic conflict, including civil war (WAR), which carries direct population health consequences and damages social infrastructure. HC is specified as the percentage of population with tertiary education which proxies for individual health knowledge and non-health public sector capacity (EDUC). D is specified using two variables: first, the percentage of population living in urban settings, as processes of urbanization shape individual access to healthcare, employment, and exposure to risk factors (URBAN), and second, population dependency ratios (DEP), with youth and elderly as dependents, to adjust for pressure on healthcare systems, as youth and elderly consume the greatest amount of healthcare, and population ageing, which independently affects mortality. λ is the Inverse-Mill ratio calculated from the first-stage, µ is a vector of country-specific dummies, and η is a vector of period dummies.
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In the first stage equation 2b, MPRIV is the binary variable for implementation of mass privatization, ETH measures the size of the second largest ethnic minority as a percentage of the population stratified into three categories, DEBT is the natural log of total external debt, with a zero for countries and periods which features no debt, FSU is a regional dummy for membership in the Former Soviet Union, and X indicates that the first stage nests the second stage covariates to avoid misspecification.
Our main hypothesis is that β 1 <0. We also hypothesize that β 2 >0, β 3 <0, β 4 >0, β 5 >0, β 6 <0, β 7 >0, and β 8 <0.
Serial Correlation, Heteroskedasticity, and Unit Roots
Testing our data for nonconstant variance with the Breusch-Pagan method indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity. We also find evidence of first-order autocorrelation in our panel. Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests reject the presence of unit roots in the life expectancy data. 9 Thus we specify an AR(1) model with country-specific serial correlation using the Prais-Winsten transformation and generalized least squares estimation to produce asymptotically consistent parameters. Robust panel-corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995) are calculated to adjust for heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation across panels. Since the panel is unbalanced, the covariance matrix is generated using all available observations rather than only time periods without missing data (which produces slightly higher standard errors here) unless the matrix is not full rank or not positive definite.
Results
First we present our basic model of the effect of privatization on male life expectancy, followed by tests of the consequences of earlier and more extensive privatization strategies. We then undertake a series of robustness checks to account for potential endogeneity and strengthen the case for causality. Table 3 shows the results of the basic equation. All three privatization measures, both with and without controls for fixed effects, cause significant male life expectancy losses. Although the coefficients vary, the net effects are similar in size, ranging from 1.28 years lost for countries which implemented mass privatization to between 0.56 and 0.98 years lost in those same countries for average increases in the EBRD privatization indicators.
Effect of Privatization Policy on Male Life Expectancy
To put these effects in perspective, according to our model a doubling of per capita GDP would achieve roughly a 1.60 year increase in male life expectancy. That is, growth would need to increase by nearly 80% just to offset the social harms of Both greater urbanization and higher dependency ratios decrease life expectancy as predicted.
Since the two EBRD variables are highly correlated (r = 0.85) and don't appear to be capturing systematically different relationships with regard to life expectancy outcomes, we proceed using an average of the EBRD privatization indices to dilute measurement error.
Testing Rapid versus Gradual Privatization Strategies
There are two ways that the pace of privatization has been treated in the literature:
in terms of how early privatization reforms were implemented and how extensive those reforms were. While most empirical analyses consider one or the other, in Tables 4a and   4b we test both. First we interact EBRD privatization measures with the first and second half of the transition period. Each one point increase in privatization prior to 1996 decreased life expectancy by -0.54 years, whereas increases after 1996 were negative but not significant (Table 4a ). These results suggest that delaying reforms to later periods shielded populations from social harms associated with privatization. Second we test the effect of more extensive privatization by breaking privatization scores into four intervals. Table 4b shows evidence that higher privatization scores, as compared with little or no privatization, became increasingly more adverse to male life expectancy, albeit at a decreasing rate. Taken together, these findings provide strong evidence that countries which adopted earlier and more extensive privatization reforms -or more "rapid" privatization programs -had greater social costs.
Effect of Privatization Reversals on Male Life Expectancy
To further show that the direction of causality runs from privatization to worse health and not the other way around, we code an indicator for whether the EBRD privatization indices decreased from the previous period (not shown). In this model, the coefficient for a privatization reversal is positive 0.26 and significant at p<0.05. Together with the previous findings, this shows that greater increases in a country's privatization decrease male life expectancy and that conversely when countries reverse privatization its male life expectancy improves as a result.
Sample and Specification Robustness Checks
We next sequentially add several variables identified by the individual health production model (eq. 3) to the right-hand side in order to test the robustness of our basic findings. None of the additional controls had any significant effect (Table 5 ). However, in several models the coefficient of privatization was modestly attenuated or enhanced, although this could occur simply due to variations in the sample size as a result of missing data.
Endogeneous Selection Bias
Lastly, we evaluate the possibility that unobserved societal or economic conditions may account for both the adoption of mass privatization policies and the mortality crisis net of our controls. Perhaps, the countries with the worst predisposing conditions, or as some argue, most corrupt governments (B. Black, Kraakman, R., and A.
Tarassova, 2000), adopt rapid privatization programs as a measure of desperation. If this were the case, it is plausible that life expectancy was going to fall in the countries which implemented mass privatization irrespective of the policy. Table 6 shows the results of 2SLS and Heckman-type selection models. 10 The coefficient on the EBRD average privatization index is -0.42, which does not significantly differ from models without using instrumentation. However, we find evidence of endogeneity for mass privatization -even with controls for fixed effects. The estimated effect of mass privatization significantly increases to -2.24, and the selection coefficient is positive and significant at p<0.05. These results suggest that failing to control for unobserved differences between countries that privatized and countries that didn't privatize understates the relationship between mass privatization and mortality.
The first step model of the determinants of privatization suggests why this is the case (Appendix 1). The biggest factor in explaining intra-former Soviet Union variation in privatization is ethno-national structure, which is historically determined. Those regions that were industrialized under the Soviet Union had a large ethnic Russian population that staffed many of the specialist occupations of the new enterprises. Thus, the countries that mass privatized were also likely to be the more industrialized ones, and as a result were more protected from large-scale economic disturbances.
10 Our instruments satisfy required statistical properties. Greater sizes of the Russian minority, membership in the Former Soviet Union, and increased external debt are each significantly scorrelated with mass privatization. Tests for overidentification, or regressing the residuals from the second-stage model using the full set of controls on the instrument set, reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are correlated with the error term of the male life expectancy equation. This reinforces the claim that the size of the ethnic Russian population, membership in the former Soviet Union, and logged external debt levels, after adjustment for the set of controls described, affects our health measures through increasing a country's likelihood of adopting mass privatization as a property reform strategy (orthogonality condition).
Discussion
Rapid privatization, by increasing male death rates, played a critical role in the past century's worst peacetime mortality crisis. Even if successive empirical analysis proves growth benefits, it is extremely unlikely that these gains will be sufficient in magnitude and equitable in distribution to outweigh the tremendous social costs identified in our study. This line of analysis, by using health data as an indicator of economic success or failure, offers one of the first expressions of Amartya Sen's recommendations for empirical welfare evaluations of economic policies (A. Sen, 1998).
Despite our rigorous robustness checks and efforts to account for potential endogeneity, our analysis has several methodological limitations. First, there are no comparative privatization rate data available. The existing EBRD indices are subject to considerable bias, and "reflect the judgment of the EBRD's Office of the Chief Economist about country-specific progress in transition." Given that the Post-Soviet episodes of privatization have been without doubt the largest economic experiment in modern history, such limitations to evaluative infrastructure are of concern. Monitoring and evaluation of policy experiments in milieu should focus both on program implementation and outcomes. In many contexts, such as the Postcommunist one, the linkage between the two is not direct, and our study is as a result unable to fully differentiate between these aspects.
Second, although we control for differences in health surveillance between countries, there is potential for bias arising from time-varying surveillance changes within countries. It is, however, unlikely that the temporal variation in surveillance can account for the relationship between privatization and health net of our control variables.
Since studies have linked privatization to decreased state capacity (L. King and P. Hamm 2005) , and as a result worsened health surveillance which would lead to greater underreporting, the direction of the potential bias is probably conservative.
Finally, as with all cross-country studies there is potential for ecologic fallacy.
However a large body of ethnographic and micro-level research supports our hypothesis, and it is plausible that rapid privatization, by catastrophically increasing work-related stress and eroding social safety nets, fuels mortality increases (E. Brainerd, 1998) . In a longer version of this article, we find that rapid privatization explains increases in alcohol-related mortality, suicides and heart-disease mortality. Note: † -Robust standard errors in parentheses. ‡ -Prais-Winsten transformation used to accommodate AR(1) disturbance with robust panel-corrected standard errors; models also control for two-way fixed effects. Hausman-Taylor χ 2 = 44.23 (p<0.01), favors fixed effects over random effects. * -p<0.05, ** -p<0.01, *** -p<0.001 Note: Results presented from four separate regression models. † -Robust panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. ‡ -Robust standard errors adjust for selection. Models control for the effects of price liberalization, occurrence of military and ethnic conflict, percentage of population urban, age-dependency ratio, and percentage population with tertiary education and country-and timedummies. * -p<0.05, ** -p<0.01, *** -p<0.001 
